



## **USAID's Humanitarian Assistance Highlights**

### **Overview**

- USAID contributed an estimated \$674 million of traditional emergency assistance in 1995. This included \$172 million in international disaster assistance for 57 declared emergencies and \$502 million in PL 480 Title II emergency food aid for nearly 24 million people.
- Within the past decade the number of crises (both complex emergencies and natural disasters) to which the U.S. responded increased by 40 percent.
- From 1989 to 1994 the number of complex emergencies to which the U.S. government responded soared from 17 to 41 percent of all officially declared emergencies worldwide.

### **Prevention: Potential impact of crises reduced**

- In response to the growing number of complex emergencies, USAID is concentrating more on prevention and transition activities in addition to traditional relief responses.
- USAID is breaking new ground in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution through development of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI).

### **Relief: Urgent needs met**

- In 1995, USAID responded to 19 complex emergencies and 38 natural disasters in 51 countries, expending more than \$172 million. USAID responded to natural disasters including 20 floods, three epidemics, two hurricanes, four droughts, a volcanic eruption, a volcanic mudslide, and a locust outbreak. USAID provided relief in Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, and Rwanda.
- Emergency food assistance was provided to 23 countries (mostly in sub-Saharan Africa), providing rations for an estimated 5.6 million refugees, 11.7 million internally displaced people, and 5.5 million drought-affected people.

### **Transition: Security and basic institutions functioning**

- Since the 1990s, USAID has supported demobilization of soldiers and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society in El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda. In El Salvador, 20,350 ex-combatants (43 percent of them women) have been trained in trades and agriculture and more than 28,000 beneficiaries have received land titles.
- Significant progress has been made in documenting, tracing, and reunifying unaccompanied children with family members in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda (where 41,850 children have been registered and documented), and the former Yugoslavia.

### **Prevention, Relief, and Development Linkages**

- USAID links emergency humanitarian assistance to long-term development programs. Well-designed relief programs are springboards for development, and development programs play an important role in prevention and transition from crisis, as illustrated by USAID activities in Ethiopia, Haiti, and Romania.



## 6. Pursuing Humanitarian Assistance

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UNTIL THE EARLY 1980s, humanitarian assistance was largely confined to disaster relief and emergency feeding programs following disasters. Since the end of the cold war, providing humanitarian assistance has changed dramatically. By the end of the 1980s, the struggle throughout the developing world had been largely supplanted by ethnic and national tensions, increasing civil strife, particularly in Africa. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, political unrest became widespread in many of the former iron curtain countries. The international donor community needed new approaches to cope with these evolving crises.

The term “complex emergency” was coined to identify these escalating phenomena. Complex emergencies are man-made crises, sometimes made worse by natural events (such as drought), in which external assistance to the afflicted is hampered by intense levels of political and military considerations. An example of this type of crisis is an ethnic-based civil war. Other humanitarian crises include natural disasters: earthquakes, epidemics, floods, hurricanes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanoes. Humanitarian assistance includes preventing, mitigating the ef-

fects of, responding to, and transitioning from all types of crises using external aid.

In addition to causing human suffering, natural and man-made emergencies hinder sustainable development. Not only can a single disaster eradicate years of development progress in a matter of minutes, but complex civil conflicts can destroy a country’s social, economic, and political institutions. In Africa, for example, only 2 percent of International Disaster Assistance and Title II emergency funding was committed to short-term emergencies. In response to new challenges, USAID has expanded the conventional view of humanitarian assistance. It now encompasses prevention and transition activities as well as traditional relief responses. The range of activities USAID uses to respond to a complex emergency or transition situation cuts across the Agency’s other four strategic objectives. They are often funded by multiple sources, including Development Assistance Fund, Economic Support Fund, PL 480, Development Fund for Africa, and disaster assistance monies.

Civil strife and other disasters have strained the international community’s humanitarian and development resources.

Worldwide spending on humanitarian assistance increased from an estimated \$2.7 billion in 1985 to \$6 billion in 1993. Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided more than 80 percent of the world's humanitarian aid in 1993. The United States and the European Union provided 86 percent of food aid to 50 countries in 1994 at a cost of \$1.3 billion. USAID contributed an estimated \$674 million of traditional emergency assistance in 1995. This included \$172 million in international disaster assistance for 57 declared emergencies and some transition countries, and \$502 million in PL 480 Title II emergency food aid for nearly 24 million people.

A reflection of the changing situation is the growth in number of overseas disasters to which the U.S. Government has responded. Between 1986 and 1995 responses increased by 40 percent. During 1995 most humanitarian assistance was directed toward responding to crises created by civil strife and other types of complex emergencies. From 1989 through 1994 the number of complex emergencies to which the U.S. Government responded soared from 17 to 41 percent of all officially declared emergencies worldwide (see figure 6.1). Over the past year, 90 percent of the Agency's international disaster assistance expenditures went to the victims of complex emergencies.

USAID is not alone in adapting to new challenges of the post-cold war era. U.S. policies have been reexamined to facilitate

expanding interagency activity in planning, decision-making, and execution of humanitarian assistance. Roles and responsibilities, domestically and internationally, are being redefined. Effective and efficient humanitarian assistance is achieved only through coordination and integration of activities within governmental agencies, the private sector, and with other donors.


## USAID's Humanitarian Assistance Goal and Strategy

One of the five USAID strategic concerns, humanitarian assistance is "lives saved, suffering reduced, and development potential reinforced." In late 1995, USAID created and adopted a strategic framework (see figure 6.2). The framework sets forth the Agency's strategic and programmatic approaches for achieving its humanitarian assistance goal. Success will be measured through the achievement of humanitarian assistance objectives that contribute to the goal. The objectives fall into three categories: pre-disaster interventions, relief responses, and transition to stability following crises.

Given the rise in the number and cost of these complex emergencies, USAID is expanding its view of humanitarian assistance to encompass more preventive and postcrisis measures to reduce the need for humanitarian assistance. However, while natural disaster preparedness, mitigation and postcrisis rehabilitation are relatively

well developed parts of traditional humanitarian assistance, similar approaches for complex emergencies are in their infancy. USAID is attempting to significantly strengthen its ability to detect crises before they occur. When crises cannot be forecast or prevented, USAID's policy is to concentrate resources on returning the affected population to

Figure 6.1 Number of Declared Emergencies by Type: 1985-95<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup>Civil strife includes displaced persons/emergencies/expellees/refugees



productivity as quickly as feasible.

In addition to addressing crisis prevention and relief, USAID is directing assistance to countries transitioning out of emergencies. Currently about one third of the world's countries are emerging from crises but are still in the predemocracy, interim-government stage. Assistance at this tenuous juncture could obviate the need for far more extensive and expensive humanitarian assistance, should these countries slip into continuing social and political chaos.

Given this concern, sound transitional and rehabilitative programs must also be preventive. USAID is therefore committed to specific transitional and development activities that serve both transition and prevention purposes. These include activities that reinforce democracy, restore infrastructure, protect the environment, promote economic growth, and encourage improvements in population planning and health. Due to the cross-cutting nature of such assistance activities across these agency goals (often funded from outside traditional humanitarian assistance accounts), the extent and impact of humanitarian programs is not yet fully understood.

## Measuring Performance

Tracking humanitarian assistance performance as a distinct program sector is new for USAID, and further substantial research is needed. During the past year a serious effort has been made by intra-Agency working groups to review, refine, and revise a minimum set of core Agency indicators. USAID has developed tentative sets of performance indicators to systematically assess the effectiveness of the Agency in achieving its humanitarian assistance objectives. These will be tested over the next year and refined, as needed, to provide the best information possible to measure the Agency's progress toward its humanitarian assistance goal.

Currently, programs pursuing the humanitarian assistance strategic objectives are reporting performance indicators such as mortality rates, malnutrition rates, and emergency response times. Some indicators measure provision of products, such as the number

of blankets or tools distributed, or the volume of seeds provided. Others measure broader needs, such as primary health care and access to schooling services. In the future, the Agency may be able to report results using more standard sets of indicators than it can use at present.


A preliminary analysis of strategic plans indicates that one fourth of the programs have intermediate results that contribute to achieving the humanitarian assistance goal. Among those units, nearly a third are pursuing prevention activities, about half are working to provide humanitarian relief, and more than half are supporting a country's transition from relief to development. We anticipate that as new strategy plans are developed and others are updated, more units will identify specific results that help achieve the Agency's humanitarian assistance objectives, particularly in crisis prevention.

## Potential Impact of Humanitarian Crises Reduced (Prevention)

Prevention approaches to reduce the impact of humanitarian crises include identifying populations and potential impacts of natural and complex disasters, and strengthening institutions that conduct preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution, early warning, environmental protection, and disaster mitigation, preparedness, and relief. They also include establishing coordination mechanisms and sharing information with other donor governments, regional and international organizations, and the private sector (including private voluntary organizations [PVOs] and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). Finally, prevention involves conducting research on new lifesaving technologies, techniques, and practices. To prevent the recurrence of conflicts, these approaches are also employed in countries undergoing transition to development.

Although it is not always possible to prevent emergencies, their impact can be reduced. Traditionally, USAID has viewed this area in terms of helping mitigate the effects of natural disasters. With USAID's increas-

**Figure 6.3**  
**Agency Program Approaches**  
**Contributing to Agency Objective 5.1**



ing involvement in complex emergencies, the Agency is using a more strategic approach. It seeks to identify and address the root causes of these crises, as it has for two decades in mitigating the effects of natural disasters. The approach requires careful and creative integration of Agency resources.

### ***Strengthening Early Warning and Preparedness Systems***

USAID has played a key role in developing effective early warning, preparedness, and mitigation systems for natural disasters, such as the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) in Africa, the disaster management training in Latin America, and a worldwide industrial accident prevention program.

One of the most successful disaster early warning initiatives sponsored by USAID is the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program, conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Geological Survey. This early warning system has prompted evacuations of threatened populations before eruptions, saving hundreds of thousands of lives.

In late 1994, USAID dispatched a volcano assistance team of volcanologists and

their cache of monitoring equipment to the volcanic caldera surrounding the city of Rabaul in Papua New Guinea. By providing equipment and technical assistance to the local volcano observatory, the team helped local officials determine an appropriate evacuation plan, leading to the timely departure of approximately 40,000 people. When the volcano finally did erupt on September 19, 1994, 40 percent of the buildings in the town were destroyed or damaged, but only four people were killed. Compared with more than 500 people killed in a 1937 eruption, a considerable number of lives were saved. During 1995, USAID dispatched volcano assistance teams to volcanic events in Cape Verde, Indonesia, Mexico, Montserrat, and Zaire.

### ***Strengthening Institutions That Conduct Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution***

Particularly in instances of complex emergencies and conflict potential, USAID is breaking new ground in prevention. In a collaborative effort, including essential African participation, USAID, other governmental agencies, and international donors are pooling resources for humanitarian assistance and long-term development growth in the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). This coor-

#### **Box 6.1 Preventing Famine in Southern Africa**

A severe drought struck southern Africa during the 1994–95 agricultural growing season. However, because of timely early warning in late 1994 and preplanning for drought response, most southern African countries were able to take initial actions to prevent the drought from becoming a famine. For example, market liberalization, supported by USAID long-term development programs, reduced the need for massive humanitarian food aid in Zambia. Since USAID has promoted increased private sector marketing of maize since 1991, the United States provided only 20,000 metric tons of food aid in 1994–95 as compared with 550,000 metric tons in previous years.

minated approach is expected to improve efficiently and effectively the impact and return on development investments in the Greater Horn of Africa, a region of enormous natural and human resource potential.

Since 1994, the United States has been working with African leaders and other donors to create a vision for the future of the troubled region. In the Greater Horn, a growing number of crises has disrupted longer term development prospects and increased requirements for emergency and relief assistance. To date, progress has been considerable in developing a consensus for a regional African initiative in the Horn of Africa.

GHAI's achievements include:

- Consensus on common goals of food security and the need to address root causes of political conflict
- African ownership of a process to restructure economic and political relations through a regional organization centered on food security, long-term development, and conflict prevention
- Donor commitment to consult and coordinate integrated emergency and relief interventions and early warning and response capacity


The initiative has gained wide African support, goodwill, and new leadership by a number of the more progressive leaders in the Greater Horn of Africa. Steps taken by African leaders thus far have demonstrated a commitment to strengthening their own regional forum by developing action plans to enhance food security, long-term development, and conflict prevention.

## Urgent Needs Met in Crisis Situations (Relief)

Timely and effective emergency relief activities include meeting human needs (particularly of women and children), enhancing short-term food security, and coordinating emergency activities with other countries and relief organizations.

In 1994, 140 million people were affected in the 65 disasters to which USAID responded. Although fewer than half were

**Figure 6.4**  
**Agency Program Approaches**  
**Contributing to Agency Objective 5.2**



complex emergencies, a few emergencies consumed the bulk of the resources. In 1995 nearly 24 million people received emergency food aid. Approximately 60 percent of these were in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Asia, Europe, and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, and Latin America.

USAID's programs are paying particular attention to meeting the needs of women and children since they are often more vulnerable during crises. For example, of the 15 million refugees in the world, 80 percent are women and children. Since USAID programs aim at increasing development for those most in need, women and children are often the primary beneficiaries of USAID humanitarian assistance.

Emergency situations call for a wide range of responses to profound threats to human lives and property. USAID relief responses often combine dollar relief resources with PL 480 feeding programs. In 1995, the Agency responded to 57 declared disasters in 51 countries at a cost of more than \$172 million. Nineteen disasters were complex emergencies; the others were natural disasters or epidemics (see table 6.1).



**Table 6.1 Emergency Food-Aid Recipients by Region FY 1995<sup>a</sup>**  
(000s)

Region	Refugees/ Returnees	Drought	Displaced Persons	Other Emergency	Total
Asia	2,347	400	1,525	0	4,272
Europe/NIS	410	0	3,040	0	3,450
LAC	23	0	0	647	647
Africa	2,850	5,055	7,143	258	15,306
Total	5,607	5,455	11,708	905	23,675

<sup>a</sup> Assisted by Title II

### ***Timely and Effective Response to Meet Critical Needs***

In 1995, USAID responded to 39 officially declared natural disasters. They included 20 floods, 3 epidemics, 2 hurricanes, 4 droughts, a volcano, a fire, a volcanic mudslide, and a locust outbreak.

Of the three epidemics (including an outbreak of cholera in Niger) the most noteworthy was the Ebola outbreak in Zaire. This response demonstrates the close link between prevention and timely relief response. On May 9, 1995, the World Health Organization and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed an outbreak of hemorrhagic fever around the town of Kikwit, in Zaire. It was caused by the mysterious Ebola virus, which is transmitted by direct contact with infected body fluids. There is no vaccine or known cure.

By May 14 the Agency had funded the first flight to Zaire carrying plasma substitute, protective medical clothing, and body bags. These supplies were immediately distributed to local Zairian health workers and international relief agencies in the Kikwit area. A second USAID-funded planeload of supplies arrived on June 6. In all, 7,000 pounds of supplies were sent to Zaire to prevent the spread of the virus. USAID also funded deployment of an emergency epidemiological team from the CDC to expand ongoing surveillance and control activities. On June 9, after 201 lives had been lost, CDC announced the epidemic had been brought under control.

In September 1995, USAID responded to two successive hurricanes, Luis and Marilyn. They battered the eastern Caribbean islands of Antigua, Barbuda, Nevis, and St. Kitts. Sixteen people were reported killed by the storm and thousands were left homeless. The day after Hurricane Luis devastated Antigua, USAID sent the first international relief flight to the island, prepared with tents, plastic sheeting, blankets, water containers, chain saws, and work gloves. The Agency sent three more planeloads of relief supplies to Antigua, Nevis, and St. Kitts in the following days, along with a team of disaster experts to conduct needs assessments on the affected islands. After citizens of New York state collected thousands of pounds of medical supplies, blankets, and shelter material, USAID, with support from the New York National Guard and the U.S. Marine Corps, helped coordinate an airlift of needed supplies to the region.

Relief related to complex emergencies also addresses a wide variety of needs and is often related to transition out of crisis. An example of this is USAID's collaborative relief efforts in Armenia. Because of the breakup of the former Soviet Union and economic embargoes resulting from the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian people suffered from a breakdown of the central heating system and near lack of electricity. A "winter warmth" activity, which began in 1993 and will continue into 1996, provides heating kerosene and heaters to identified vulnerable population groups and to schools during the winter months. More than 200,000 families (roughly 25 percent of the popula-

tion) have received heating assistance each winter. Since the program began, schools have remained open during the winter.

While an American PVO monitored the process, the local governments distributed kerosene and heaters. Many of the heaters and all of the storage canisters procured for the program were manufactured in Armenia, thus supporting private enterprise development and generating employment. The European Union has also contributed locally manufactured heaters, and a French PVO, working through an Armenian PVO, contributed to the school heating program.

This humanitarian endeavor has provided the Armenian government extra resources to renovate, restart, and sustain the district heating system. Each year has been marked by a reduction in beneficiaries in the capital city of Yerevan, made possible by increased availability of central heating. The targets of this assistance have been further refined annually, closely coordinated with the Beacon Beneficiary Registration Program, to ensure that only the truly needy receive humanitarian assistance.

### ***Enhancing Short-Term Food Security***

In 1995, a substantial part of USAID's relief response was over \$502 million in emergency PL 480 food assistance provided to 23 countries. These resources provided rations for an estimated 5.6 million refugees, 11.7 million internally displaced people, and 5.5 million drought-affected people. More than three quarters of 24 million recipients of USAID emergency food assistance was used in sub-Saharan Africa in 1995 (see box 6.2).

Two examples of successful relief efforts to ensure short-term food security occur in Africa. Both demonstrate the links between relief, transition, and prevention, and the integration of relief activities with other donors. As Rwanda and Burundi teetered on the brink of crisis during 1995, some 2.8 million refugees, internally displaced people, and other victims faced the daunting problem of feeding themselves. Within Rwanda itself, most farms were fallow, and employment opportunities were limited. The general inability of the government to manage the

### **Box 6.2 Seeds of Hope**

Seeds of Hope, an emergency program in Rwanda implemented by the International Center for Tropical Agriculture, helped to restore agricultural production and food security in the devastated country. Restoration of agricultural production was crucial in Rwanda, where the economy depends almost entirely on agriculture. USAID provided the initial funding to catalyze a program that links emergency relief intervention to long-term sustainable development. Pest-resistant seeds were propagated in neighboring countries and distributed to returning Rwandan farmers by both national and international aid organizations. Through increasing adapted and improved seed varieties, the project generated one sixth of the maize seed needed for Rwanda's annual planting season, thereby enhancing food security.

population's needs presented a picture of despair to the donor community. Burundi continued to grapple with ethnic chaos now exacerbated by more than 280,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees. Sixty percent of them were women, and they required food, shelter, and medical assistance. The principal refugee catchment areas in Zaire, from Uvira to Goma, and refugee camps in western Tanzanian held more than 650,000 refugees. Camps struggled with demands for clean water, firewood, shelter, and food.

USAID led the international community's food aid response to the regional crisis. Originally providing one third of the estimated 55,000 metric tons per month of food aid, USAID rapidly led stabilization efforts of the donors by providing two thirds of the required food. This assistance reduced the mortality rates prevalent when the crisis began. It also stabilized the nutrition levels of the majority of the vulnerable populations.

Satisfying this basic human need gave Rwanda's farmers the chance to feed themselves as they began to grow new crops. Except for areas where either security or road conditions prevented regular delivery of food aid, PVOs and international organizations confirmed that Rwanda's nutritional levels had reached levels similar to those of many African societies.

In Burundi, the Mission, with considerable assistance from USAID/Washington, provided food, water, shelter, and health care services for more 1.5 million affected people. Contributions for humanitarian assistance in Burundi from U.S. Government sources through the end of 1994 amounted to \$79.6 million. Much of USAID/Burundi development achievements since 1977 were reversed by the crisis. The major impact of USAID's humanitarian activities can be seen in the absence of malnutrition and low morbidity and infant mortality rates (3 per 10,000 population and 1 per 10,000, respectively) for the affected population, despite the destruction and devastation of the past months. The concerted efforts ensured that 1) the most vulnerable people were adequately identified, 2) food aid was arriving on time, and 3) the right amounts of commodities were available.

USAID has also saved lives in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina by identifying vulnerable populations and providing emergency food aid. Since conflict began, the winter months have been a critical period for the country's vulnerable populations. Household food stocks often run out. Beneficiaries are most dependent on international food aid. The population is most susceptible to malnutrition and disease. The international community feared that mass starvation would kill thousands of Bosnians during the debilitating winters.

Starting in the winter of 1993-94, USAID began to fund the World Health Organization's monitoring of the nutritional status of vulnerable groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From December through May, WHO personnel visited and surveyed a monthly average of 120 households with more than 400 members in the most adversely affected areas, including Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla.


Two successive winter surveys concluded that mass starvation and significant undernutrition had been avoided in target areas largely because of food aid and support for local coping mechanisms. The surveys also concluded that USAID and other donor food production projects had provided substantial farm and garden food supplies for the resident and displaced populations in Zenica and Tuzla. In Sarajevo, the survey found,

most families supplemented their food-aid rations by selling or exchanging their possessions for food on the black market. These conclusions have influenced efforts to better target USAID food aid to the most vulnerable beneficiaries, to expand USAID-funded agricultural and horticultural production programs, and to promote local income-generating projects, especially for women.

## Security Established and Basic Institutions Functioning to Meet Critical Needs and Protect Basic Rights (Transition)

Transition activities seek to facilitate the successful return of countries from the disruptive chaos of crisis to the path of sustainable development. Such activities include supporting demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into the civil society, addressing concerns of displaced and vulnerable populations, promoting civil-military relations, removing land mines, and resolv-

**Figure 6.5**  
**Agency Program Approaches**  
**Contributing to Agency Objective 5.3**



ing conflicts. USAID also supports activities that build respect for basic freedoms (speech, assembly, movement), enhance capacity for democratic governance, expand public participation, enrich communications, and encourage community involvement.

### ***Demobilizing and Reintegrating Ex-Combatants***

Since the early 1990s, USAID has supported demobilization of soldiers and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society as a pivotal aspect of transition from complex crisis to development. Working with other donors and international organizations, the Agency has supported programs in El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda. Demobilization enables public funds to be spent on development rather than on the military. Reintegration converts combat skills into skills more highly valued in civilian societies. Successful demobilization and reintegration signals the reestablishment of personal security among civilians.

A series of activities aimed at reintegrating ex-combatants of both sides into the civilian economy has been a major component of USAID's efforts in easing El Salvador's transition from war to peace. Since the peace accords of January 1992, \$97 million of USAID's \$300 million contribution to El Salvador's National Reconstruction Program has been committed to more than 25 activities directed at ex-combatants. Through the program, 11,000 ex-combatants have received loans for agricultural production or microenterprise development. Against a target of 18,800, a total of 20,350 people, about 43 percent of whom are women, have been trained in trades and agriculture. Twenty-two thousand ex-combatants have taken six-month vocational training courses or have enrolled in two- to five-year academic programs. In addition, 42,000 men and women have been trained since 1992.

In its efforts to reactivate the El Salvadorean economy, the Agency has also provided \$34 million for the purchase and distribution of farmland through the Land Bank. More than 28,000 beneficiaries, including 16,300 noncombatant squatters associated with the insurgent Farabundo Martí

National Liberation Front (FMLN), have received land titles. USAID's \$60 million is the largest donor contribution to this program. In 1994, 64 percent of new land recipients in the former conflict zones had their land in production, a significant increase from the 25 percent of Land Bank clients in March 1993. Women constitute 26 percent of the land distribution beneficiaries. Under the Land Transfer Program more than 6,200 ex-combatants and squatters received farmland in 1994 for a total of more than 11,000 since 1992. This program will continue through 1997.

In total 10,700 ex-FMLN troops, 10,300 ex-government troops, and 4,200 demobilized national police have benefited from at least one, and generally several, of these programs. Also, 2,300 ex-FMLN combatants have received prosthetics/orthotics, reconstructive surgery, and other medical attention, and 890 war-wounded people on both sides have received vocational, occupational, or physical rehabilitation services. Recent Gallup surveys indicate that 80 percent of the ex-combatants perceive themselves as an integral part of Salvadoran society, and 97 percent believe their economic and social opportunities are similar to those of the rest of the civilian population.

### ***Strengthening Local Governance and Institutions that Promote Reconciliation***

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives is setting precedents in two countries "in transition": Haiti and Angola. In Haiti, the Agency is working to establish local governance and promote citizen participation in rural areas: 1,000 grass-roots projects selected by and implemented with the assistance of the local community are under way and having immediate "people level" impact.

With the arrival of a multinational force in Haiti and the guarantee of safe return for exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the task for USAID was clear: to assist the Haitian government in fostering participatory self-government at the community level. When the Agency's assessment teams hit the ground in early October, they determined that helping 70 percent of the Haitian population outside of Port-au-Prince would take a care-

ful combination of resources. To transform the political environment from intimidation to development, USAID, with the help of the Geneva-based International Organization for Migration, developed a communal governance program. This initiative became the core of a program that has linked a wide range of NGOs, international PVOs, and the U.S. military into a partnership for recovery.

A plan was developed by the partnership for 13 regional offices, six of which were opened by November 1994. The remaining seven were opened by January 1995. These offices housed a core international staff who worked together with community leaders to identify projects that would benefit the locale. USAID supplied seed money for projects that citizens identified. Schools were built with community support, roads repaired, sewage systems replaced, and water cisterns cleaned, all with the consensus of the communities that would use them. This quick, project-directed funding played a major role in moving leaders in communities outside of Port-au-Prince to understand the importance of reconciliation as part of the return to normalcy.

By August 1, 1995, the Communal Governance Program had engaged more than 2,000 locally based community groups. They represent well over 50,000 Haitians from throughout the country, in nearly 1,500 community improvement projects.

In Angola, the Agency's capacity-building support to the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit is increasing the UN's ability to effectively plan for demobilization of government forces and forces of UNITA—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. In both countries, USAID has played a major role in promoting a coordinated, strategic U.S. Government response to needs. Angola also illustrates lessons regarding early detection of issues, provision of important assistance to help resolve key issues, and strong interbureau and intra-Agency analysis and planning of a strategy to end the emergency and begin the transition.

In Cambodia, USAID is helping strengthen local governance through its support of dialog between citizens and the government, and strengthening rule-of-law

institutions as a basis for civil and commercial transactions. Specifically, the Agency is providing technical assistance to strengthen the National Assembly, the courts, public interest organizations, and indigenous groups. USAID's assistance to the National Assembly and to the legal, regulatory, and judicial system also is helping build a strong base for investment, dispute resolution, and property rights. Implemented through other donor organizations, these programs have produced tangible results: increased transparency in the legal system, increased respect for due process, and better trained public defenders.

### ***Improved Integration of Humanitarian and Development Assistance***

USAID has used social investment funds as a means of helping countries start recovering from economic crisis. These funds have had both short- and long-term effects on local populations. As an immediate result, poor people have gained income through job creation. In the long term, they have gained additional production and social infrastructure in their community or country. The Agency has supported these programs in Latin America (in Nicaragua after the Chamorro government took office and in Haiti after Aristide was returned to office). This mechanism is also proving useful in Armenia.

Several years ago in Armenia, USAID granted \$1 million to start a social investment fund and finance implementation of pilot projects to create jobs, provide related training, and help communities identify and implement their own activities. The World Bank is providing \$20 million in loan funds to the Armenian government to finance further development and implementation of the concept.

This Armenian initiative demonstrates that catalytic activities do not necessarily have to be big and can leverage funds from others, achieve well-defined objectives, pull communities together, and foster networking of expertise and experiences. The Agency sees this experience as an opportunity to open a continuing dialog with the World Bank and the European Union on future activities of common interest. Among the results:

- The Armenian Ministry of the Economy has formed a unit to review, fund, and supervise grants for 15 microprojects. They include repair of roads, schools, orphanages, health facilities, fuel storage facilities, and water supply systems.
- A million dollars of USAID funding over the course of a year has leveraged a \$20 million World Bank program, which began the last quarter of 1995. World Bank assessment of the activity enabled it to make a long-term commitment and fine-tune the USAID pilot effort.

### ***Rehabilitating Social Infrastructure***

Other types of transitional assistance include USAID's Displaced Children and Orphans Fund and the War Victims' Fund. The Displaced Children and Orphans Fund began in 1989 to address the needs of orphans. It has evolved into a cohesive program directed at three categories of children: street children, children orphaned by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and unaccompanied children affected by war (see box 6.3).

#### **Box 6.3 Children in Crisis**

*Croatia*, "Unaccompanied Children in Exile project" (1994–95). USAID, the Government of Croatia, and international and indigenous NGOs developed a large-scale collaborative project to assist unaccompanied Croatian children found in 15 countries. The project provides documentation for the children, traces their families and reunites the children with their relatives, when possible. The project addresses the special needs of traumatized children.

*Guatemala*, "Child in Need project" and "Street Children Support project" (1991–97). USAID/Guatemala provides funds to local NGOs and governments to reduce the number of homeless urban youths. Project activities include vocational training, policy change, enabling legislation, judicial reform, and research.

Strategies for addressing the needs of these children stress the importance of family- and community-based care and responsibility over putting children into institutions—a large-scale, long-term proposition. Approximately \$40 million from the children and orphans fund was provided to programs in 28 countries from 1989 through 1995. Projects range in size and complexity, with most funding provided through NGOs. Major initiatives in Brazil, Guatemala, and Vietnam have helped strengthen and enforce policies and legislation protecting children's rights. Other program features include health, education, and vocational training, and legal and psychological counseling services. Smaller country interventions have had a more limited scope but stress program impact within the projects' spheres of attention.

A significant and innovative area of recent Displaced Children and Orphans Fund assistance has been the documentation, tracing, and reunification of unaccompanied children in Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. For example, 41,800 Rwandan children have been registered and documented (about half the total number of separated children in camps and transit centers). This program serves as a model for similar crises, such as those in Bosnia.

Yearly expenditures for the War Victims Fund have averaged \$5 million. The major countries involved are Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Laos, Liberia, Mozambique, Uganda, and Vietnam.

Amputees and other disabled people require continuing access to rehabilitation services. Sustained services are maximized by improving programs with a financial base, rather than by initiating new activities entirely dependent on USAID support. In addition, guidelines stress that the programs should target a few countries where they can have a significant impact. Finally, the fund supports a systems approach involving the full range of medical, physical, and vocational rehabilitation.

The philosophical underpinning of the War Victims Fund is the commitment that the maximum number of civilian victims of war

be provided assistance that will give them the best possible opportunity to participate in normal social and economic activity. Records show that 20,000 limbs are being produced with fund assistance over any 12-month period (see box 6.4).

### **Box 6.4 Rehabilitation for Victims of War**

*Afghanistan.* From 1990 through 1994, Handicap International started prosthetic workshops at four rural hospitals and the American Red Cross improved surgical care for land-mine victims. These projects provided more than 8,000 prosthetic and orthotic devices and trained two female and three male technicians who now work in rehabilitation centers around the country.

*El Salvador.* Since 1994, World Rehabilitation Fund provides grants to local NGOs that help disabled victims of war. USAID-supported accomplishments over the past five years include development of an in-country prosthetic training program that has graduated 12 Salvadorean technicians. It includes as well production and fitting of 4,000 prosthetic and orthotic devices.

*Cambodia.* Since 1991, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, (now Veterans International) has worked with other NGOs to foster a coordinated approach to prosthetic technology. The organization has produced more than 4,000 prostheses and 1,000 orthoses. It has built more than 2,000 wheelchairs, which have been distributed among NGOs and the Cambodian Ministry of Social Action.

### **Rehabilitating Safe Environments and Physical Infrastructure**

The path to rehabilitation and disaster recovery must involve economic development over the long term. Therefore, economic growth activities must be integrated with humanitarian assistance objectives. For example, training sections of the Cambodian labor force and building a market-oriented policy framework are secondary to the removal of the 8 to 10 million land mines still in the country, which pose mortal threats.

Cambodia's political strife over the last several decades has destroyed physical infrastructure, hampering economic growth. USAID/Cambodia's efforts to rebuild the country's economy include rehabilitation of national highways and rural roads and reduction in the number of land mines.

The Agency has built 500 kilometers of rural roads in the northwest and is rebuilding a critical transport area between the capital city of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville, the country's only deep-water ocean port. Also, by working with many PVOs to conduct skills-training programs, USAID is helping Cambodians develop entrepreneurial skills and open or expand small enterprises. Essential to economic progress, these programs also have an important humanitarian dimension in that they help reduce societal tensions and develop democratic interregional communications.

Similarly, in El Salvador's transition from conflict to stability, the lack of reliable transport has been a major impediment to small businesses and agricultural development. A total of 130 NGOs have taken part in reconstruction activities in the ex-conflictive zones. About \$70 million has been channeled through NGOs. Three fourths of the population in the former conflict zones (estimated 1992 census: 1.4 million) have benefited from more than 2,200 infrastructure projects through the Municipalities in Action program (schools, electricity, health centers, potable water systems). One sixth of the inadequate roads in the former conflict zones have been improved with U.S. funds, benefiting more than 700,000 people.

In 1994, 67 schools were built or rehabilitated for a total of 287 since hostilities ceased. Improved primary education is now available in the conflict zones to more than 50,000 children. Fifty-six health facilities have been restored. Maternal health, family planning, and childhood vaccination programs have been brought into the zones. USAID also financed 35 local NGOs, which have provided 230,000 women with maternal and child health programs. In addition, assistance has been provided to 7,000 civilians disabled by war.

### **Box 6.5 Mozambique's Transition From War to Peace**

Mozambique signed a peace agreement in October 1992. The country emerged from a 16-year civil war, amidst one of the worst droughts of this century. More than one third of its population found refuge in neighboring countries or were internally displaced by war or drought. With all rural infrastructure destroyed, roads incapacitated from lack of maintenance or mines, and two thirds of the population in absolute poverty, economic activity was at a standstill. People survived in indescribable isolation and misery.

In a joint war-to-peace commitment involving the Mozambicans, PVOs, and donors, USAID provided emergency food, water, and medical aid; financed demobilization and election support; and supported land-mine clearance, road and bridge rehabilitation, and agricultural recovery.

Today Mozambique is a different country altogether:

- More than 91,000 soldiers were demobilized (over 88 percent of those under arms in 1992).
- First-ever multiparty elections have been held, free and fair (81 percent of eligible population registered, and 85 percent of registered voters actually voted).
- Mozambique experienced the largest voluntary population movement in the world (virtually all international refugees returned to Mozambique, and the internally displaced returned home).
- Food security has improved (both famine-risk indicators and food-aid dependence have dropped dramatically).
- Economic recovery (gross domestic product growth rates compare well with other southern Africa countries).

## **Prevention, Relief, and Development Linkages**

In 1995, USAID began to appreciate more fully the extent to which its development and humanitarian activities are linked. Clearly, well-designed relief programs are springboards for development, and development programs play an important role in prevention and transition from crises. The Agency has been successful in using long-term development strategies to prevent and respond to crises. Haiti and Ethiopia provide examples of how development and humanitarian assistance programs interacted with and reinforced each other to produce lasting benefits. In Romania, what appears to be a public health intervention also relates to the stability of a society and crisis prevention.

### ***In Haiti, From Relief to Development***

Throughout the period of turmoil, USAID's humanitarian relief activities in Haiti provided a safety net that mitigated the

impact of severe declines in all sectors. USAID's health and population activities contributed to a dramatic decrease in infant mortality and total fertility rates. The education sector program is currently increasing access to education; small entrepreneurs continue to function owing to small loans and marketing assistance; and a record number of farmers adopted environmentally sustainable agricultural practices. Because of these programs, the transition could proceed rapidly.

Particularly successful was an emergency feeding program. The intensified international embargo last year caused a calamitous decline in jobs. Without jobs, hundreds of thousands of Haitians could not buy food and other basic essentials. USAID provided a daily meal to 1.2 million people and put thousands of Haitians to work to repair and rehabilitate the country's productive infrastructure. The program also supports restoration of democratic rule in Haiti. It seeks to do this by helping to restore confidence and hope and helping to create a political climate conducive to national healing and economic recovery following restoration of the elected government.



The benefits of these activities—short-term relief and long-term economic assistance—have been substantial. Evaluators have estimated overall internal rate of return of the project at more than 50 percent. As of January 1995, more than 1,600 kilometers of irrigation canals were rehabilitated, opening almost 27,000 hectares of land to full cultivation; more than 900 kilometers of roads were rehabilitated, providing market access for more than 800,000 people; and almost 6,500 hectares of land were protected through conservation measures.

Moreover, according to the evaluators, these activities were cost-effective, an efficient means of providing resources to the intended beneficiaries. More than 80 cents of every dollar spent under this program has gone to wages. By providing hundreds of thousands of poor families with the additional income needed for adequate diets and improvements in infrastructure, the program has also had a significant effect on food security.

USAID has been instrumental in the success of Haiti's transition to democracy. The integrated set of transition initiatives included support for restoration of electrical power, reopening the parliament, demobilizing armed forces, reestablishing the Ministry of Justice, and creating and providing preliminary training for a civilian police force. The program has also leveraged \$56 million from international financial institutions. The funds have been pledged to the Haitian government to continue this USAID-designed program as a transition intervention.

### ***In Ethiopia, Preventive Development Averts Need for Relief***

USAID's integration of relief and development assistance in Ethiopia has allowed the Agency to respond to that country's significant food deficits while also addressing the root causes of chronic food insecurity. Following a better-than-average harvest in 1993, Ethiopia faced a food shortfall of more than a million metric tons in 1994 because of poor weather conditions, degradation of natural resources, previous governmental

economic policies, and rapid population growth. The shortfall was comparable to the great famine of 1984–85. Although the emergency assistance provided in 1984–85 helped save millions of lives, it did little to prevent the crisis from recurring. Today, USAID is combining emergency assistance with long-term development assistance to address Ethiopia's food insecurity.

Commodity assistance and the shift of Title III resources into food grains enabled USAID to respond quickly and decisively to Ethiopia's crisis. There were only a few areas of famine-related deaths and relatively little dislocation of populations; relief supplies reached most areas on time. By integrating development with relief activities, USAID not only responded to Ethiopia's significant food deficits, but with continued support of donors and NGOs brought about improvements in the governmental system.

For example, to make emergency food aid immediately and locally available, the Agency is using PL 480 Title III resources to establish an emergency food-security reserve against which NGOs can borrow. The government no longer sells or purchases agricultural produce at fixed below-market prices, removing disincentives for farmers to increase production. Therefore, the private sector plays a greater role in food, marketing, and volume of trade. To complement its withdrawal from subsidized food marketing, the government developed a targeted safety net program to cushion short-term adverse effects of reform on the poor. This safety net has benefited an estimated 350,000 households.

In another effort to increase food security through the private sector, the Development of Competitive Markets Program is addressing Ethiopia's low use of agricultural inputs, particularly fertilizer, a major constraint to increasing agricultural production. Through the Ethiopian government's liberalization of fertilizer marketing, private sector participation has increased. At the same time, a new Food Systems Development and Support Program helps increase use of on-farm production technologies, particularly fertilizer, to increase crop production.

## ***In Romania, AIDS and Crisis Prevention***

Prevention measures against the AIDS epidemic in Romania also illustrate the importance of crisis prevention. The social fabric of Romania was threatened in the early 1990s when Western PVOs and journalists reported on the high numbers of HIV-positive children, particularly orphans. To make orphans appear more appealing, orphanages commonly transfused them with blood and immunized them. However, the blood was sometimes contaminated and hypodermic needles were often reused, spreading the AIDS epidemic to orphans. Through the initial efforts of UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), USAID, and other donors, prevention programs were begun.

Romania has the highest incidence of pediatric AIDS in Europe, with 3,200 reported cases as of September 1995. They constitute more than 50 percent of all pediatric AIDS cases in Europe. The most affected district has been Constanta, where more than 1,200 children have been diagnosed as HIV-positive. Half have been institutionalized or abandoned.

Funding for the program since 1991, from World Vision Relief and Development, Holt International Children's Services, and UNICEF, is more than \$1.7 million. More than \$1 million of this has been U.S. Government funding and PL 480, Title II, commodities, and \$700,000 has come from private sources. USAID's assistance will continue until April 1997. Results include:

1. Since 1991, both institutions and parents have received counseling and social assistance from World Vision and Holt. Through appropriate antibiotic therapy, community support, and improved nutrition, the child mortality rate has slowed significantly, with some children able to attend school. A 1995 grant to UNICEF includes humanitarian assistance funding for a group home for HIV-positive children.

2. Parents and school teachers have been educated about universal precautions and ways of transmitting HIV. Community involvement in the care of HIV-positive children has increased. And more HIV-positive

children are remaining with their families, rather than being abandoned. The Romanian Association Against AIDS, an indigenous NGO, is developing as an advocate for AIDS awareness and source of information about HIV infection.

3. Although the Romanian government still has not openly acknowledged the severity of its AIDS epidemic, doctors from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Transport in Constanta have asked for professional advice on detection, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment. Moreover, inquiries to the Ministry of Health from Romanian officials and the press persist.

USAID's continued programs aimed at marketing and distributing contraceptives should further reduce HIV infection rates.

## **Lessons Learned and Challenges**

*Prevention initiative.* It is clear that costs of prevention are most often outweighed by costs of military or disaster relief interventions. Therefore, USAID is increasing efforts to predict and prevent disasters and crisis situations. Building on programs such as the Famine Early Warning System in Africa and OFDA prevention, mitigation, and preparedness, USAID has made timely interventions with significant savings of lives and dollars. Given the undisputed advantages of anticipating natural disasters, USAID is also beginning to place more emphasis on prevention of man-made crises.

In emergencies tied to civil conflict, early warning and preventive action are just beginning to be understood. However, it is often demonstrated that a country's prevention and response capacities are linked to its level of development. For example, India, one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, has developed sophisticated state and local disaster management capabilities and rarely turns to the donor community for assistance. It is in USAID's interest to seek greater understanding of the role of factors such as endemic poverty, environmental degradation, food scarcity, demographic tensions, ethnic and social division, and human rights abuses in the genesis of conflict.

Within USAID, responsibility for bringing conflict prevention and resolution together into a coherent strategy has been placed in the office of the Administrator, reporting to the chief of staff.

Even though prevention of complex emergencies is a nascent art, USAID has made headway in addressing some situations before crises occur. The Agency's strategic framework includes prevention of crises as one of its objectives and approaches to achieving that objective have been identified. A range of interventions complementary to the systems for early warning and mitigation of natural disasters is under consideration for complex emergencies. It includes:

- Promotion and strengthening of indigenous capacity to mitigate conflicts and cope with the effects of crises
- Linking conflict prevention to strategies for attaining and maintaining economic development, human rights, and democracy (also suggested by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace)
- Training for political party leaders in negotiation and conflict resolution
- Early warning systems that permit timely and appropriate development responses to address the root causes of conflict before violence ensues

*Coordination and burden-sharing.* Collaboration and burden-sharing with other U.S. Government agencies, other donors, and PVO/NGO partners is increasingly important. It is clear that USAID's resources will not be sufficient to meet anticipated worldwide demands. Coordination with other donors, such as Japan, Canada, or the European Union, can result in more effective humanitarian assistance. Donors' resources can be supplemented through stimulation of private resources. Partnerships with PVOs, NGOs, and others in the private sector need to be strengthened for better sharing of information, as well as more effective coordination.

*Unified strategies and integrated programs.* Countries experiencing or emerging from complex emergencies may not qualify as "sustainable development" partners, which may result in a disconnect in programming international emergency and development funds. The Agency needs to come to terms with how it should program and provide resources for these oftentimes "poor performers." Development of unified strategies prepared by teams drawn from a spectrum of the Agency may provide an effective tool to encourage discussion of, and ultimately agreement on, USAID's short- and long-term objectives for a given country.

*Linking relief and development.* In its provision of humanitarian assistance in complex emergency and transition situations, the Agency needs to define policy that identifies clear points of entry, transition, and exit from crisis situations. At the same time, USAID's development assistance needs to evaluate the potential for crisis early warning and prevention in the development portfolios as a means to peacefully resolve the root causes of conflict. USAID relief activities should reinforce development programs so that the effects of disaster assistance undergird, rather than undermine, development assistance objectives.

*USAID's comparative advantages and the role of development in preventive diplomacy.* It is in our interest to seek a greater understanding of the role of factors such as endemic poverty, environmental degradation, food scarcity, demographic tensions, and communicable disease in leading to conflict. In the early stages, development and humanitarian assistance activities can be used effectively as tools for crisis prevention. Information generated from early warning systems can be used to inform timely and appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate violent conflict and address the root causes of conflicts as identified by local leaders and peoples and policy guidance. Tools include early warning systems, democracy initiatives, and prevention partnerships.